Enterprise API Security and GDPR Compliance: Design and Implementation
  Perspective by Hussain, Fatima et al.
Enterprise API Security and GDPR Compliance:
Design and Implementation Perspective
Fatima Hussain∗, Rasheed Hussain†, Brett Noye∗, and Salah Sharieh ∗
∗ Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), Toronto, Canada
† Networks and Blockchain Lab, Institute of Information Security and Cyber-Physical Systems, Innopolis University, Russia
Abstract—With the advancements in the enterprise-level busi-
ness development, the demand for new applications and services
is overwhelming. For the development and delivery of such ap-
plications and services, enterprise businesses rely on Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs). In essence, API is a double-
edged sword. On one hand, API provides ease of expanding the
business through sharing value and utility, but on another hand it
raises security and privacy issues. Since the applications usually
use APIs to retrieve important data, therefore it is extremely
important to make sure that an effective access control and
security mechanism are in place , and the data does not fall into
wrong hands. In this article, we discuss the current state of the
enterprise API security and the role of Machine Learning (ML)
in API security. We also discuss the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) compliance and its effect on the API security.
Index Terms—API Security and GDPR, Enterprise API Secu-
rity, Automated API Security
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advancements in communication technologies,
there is myriad of applications and services that target con-
sumers in different sectors ranging from finance, health, agri-
culture, smart industries, smart environment, and human well-
being [1]. Internet of Things (IoT) is the best example of
such applications and services realized through the intercon-
nection of smart object for different purposes such as, but
not limited to, controlling home appliances remotely, moni-
toring patient’s health condition, monitoring agricultural land,
operating in hostile environments, and so on. In most of the
cases, applications and services in these domains have more
than one stakeholders. Furthermore, these services are also
shared across different platforms with different consumers,
vendors, and other related entities. Therefore, management of
these services and applications, and expanding them across
different domains and consumers, the traditional off-the-shelf
software development solutions will not scale well. Therefore,
we need a unified mechanism to make the applications and
services (both macro- and micro-services depending on the
application) easy to access, secure, able to export, and meet
the heterogeneous consumer demands. To this end, Application
Programming Interface (API) is a mechanism that makes it
easy, affordable, and scalable for the services to distribute
across different domains. More precisely, API is a set of proto-
cols, functions, mechanisms, tools, definitions, and attributes
to share and develop new services across different domains
and expand the existing services. APIs enable service inte-
gration, application development, and communication among
different services and product without need for developing
new infrastructure for each service and product. For instance,
in case of a financial institution; banking chatbots, reduction
in cost due to decoupling of platforms and rejoining through
APIs, fast agility change, enhanced operational efficiency and
availability of new distribution channels are few benefits of
using APIs for banking. Also, banks use APIs internally to
improve information flow between various legacy systems.
With rise of IoT, world around us is more connected, and APIs
has emerged as an integral business strategy across various
industries. APIhound reports more than 50,000 registered API
till date. Also, private APIs exceed in number compared to
number of public APIs. This leads to challenges of security
and privacy as lots of sensitive data being passed over the web
through APIs.
In this paper , we discuss API security, what does it mean
and what is being done traditionally? afterwards we talk about
inadequacy of the current API security measures and drive
discussion towards AI or ML driven API security. Without
loss of generality, we discuss the importance of user data
privacy and security, and how evolution of General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) have changed the paradigm of
user privacy. At the end we discuss that how GDPR is going
to affect the AI or ML driven API security.
1) Summary of contributions: The main contributions of
this paper are summarized below:
In this paper, we,
• Discuss security related issues in ML driven APIs,
• Briefly discuss GDPR compliance requirements related
to security and privacy,
• We discuss the role of GDPR on ML-driven API security
in enterprise environments.
• Challenges faced in terms of design, customer satisfac-
tion and data transparency by ML-API for being GDPR
compliance,
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we discuss APIs, API vulnerabilities and API
security models. In Section III, we discuss GDPR and its
rules contradicting with ML driven decisions. API security and
GDPR compliance is presented in Section IV. Finally, paper
is concluded in Section V.
II. API SECURITY
In this section, we discuss the API security in detail. We



















model and the role of ML in API security.
A. APIs and Their Vulnerabilities
APIs are functionally classified into two categories. The
APIs that are “used to perform an action” or APIs that “provide
an access to any object”. In the former type of APIs, an
application invokes the API and requests the original software
to perform an action (which is made available through the
invoked API). On the other hand, in the latter type APIs, an
application wants to get access to an object through the API.
Broadly speaking, there are three types of APIs: [2]
• Private API:
Private APIs are usually intended to be used solely by
the firm making the software. Companies develop private
APIs for internal software development and enhanc-
ing/providing scalability, modularity, security, access, for
expanding various services.
• Partner API:
APIs developed for usage among partners are known as
partner APIs. For instance, a firm develops a software
package for sales and marketing functions, where another
partner firm has a software for accounting. These two
softwares can be connected and and this integration
is bridged through APIs. However, it requires efficient
access control and authorization mechanisms, along with
rules and policies of the firms involved in software
development and service delivery.
• Public API:
Public APIs are intended to be used by anyone who wants
to access the software. These APIs have limited capabili-
ties and can be a potential security threat to the back end
system. More precisely, the attackers could launch attacks
camouflaged into the functions and services provided by
the APIs.
1) Vulnerabilities: In contrast to the typical websites, the
APIs open up wide access for the clients and also lure
potential hackers into the back-end systems. The potential
attack surface is significantly increased by using APIs as
granularity boundary is moved from secure internal tiers to
the user devices (through client application). Therefore, we
need security and protection mechanisms from the new class
of risks as a result of using APIs, in addition to the traditional
threats (carried out from the Web).
In a conventional web scenarios, there are only few ways of
data rendering, as some data is sent to remote systems (servers)
and it mainly depend upon the capabilities of URLs and forms.
While, APIs expose more of the HTTPS protocol and open up
data parameterization. As a result, when the data sent to APIs
(if not handled with care), increase the potential attack surface
through parameter attacks such as URL-based attacks, query
parameters, HTTP header and/or post content and so on. In
the following, we outline some potential parameters attacks
on APIs.
• Script insertions: It refers to the family of attacks that
exploit the systems that interpret the submitted parameter
content as a script (e.g. when a snippet of JavaScript is
submitted into a posting on a Web forum).
• SQL injections: It refers to an attack through query
languages where parameters that are designed to load a
certain input into a database query, are manipulated to
change the intent of an underlying SQL template.
• Bounds or buffer overflow attacks: It provides data be-
yond the expected types or range, and leads to system
crashes and also offer access to memory spaces.
In the same spirit, there are few access related attacks
specific to APIs listed below. Conventional access control
mechanism such as; user name passwords, openID, JWT
tokens etc. are powerful but leaves security gaps in API de-
ployment. These techniques requires complementary security
capabilities to address threats such as:
• API-specific DDoS attacks: These attacks overload crit-
ical API services (login and session management) and
disrupt access to these services, by sending large amounts
of traffic from multiple sources.
• Login attacks: These attacks includes, credential stuffing
(testing lists of previously breached credentials against a
target API to try to gain access), use of stolen credentials
or tokens, or fuzzing (feeding large amounts of random
data into a program to discover vulnerabilities).
• Application & data attacks: These attacks include data
theft, data deletion or manipulation, code injection, and
application disruption.
We can categorize API security vulnerabilities systemati-
cally, by target areas. These categorization also takes into
account where and how various attacks on API potentially
breech the security. For instance:
• Network, operating system, and driver issues are related
to operating system and network components such as
buffer overflows, flooding with sockets, and Denial of
Service (DOS) attacks etc.
• Application layer issues are related to hosting application,
server and related services such as message parsing,
session hijacking or security mis-configurations.
• API component functional issues are related to actual
APIs such as injection attacks, sensitive data exposure,
incomplete access control and so on.
B. Traditional API Security Model
Traditional API security model incorporates tasks related
to authentication, throttling, and communication security as
shown in the Figure 1. These are powerful tools but are not
considered comprehensive solution for addressing specialized
API threats; such as API-specific denial of service, application
and data and log-in attacks [2]. Therefore, a comprehensive
API security solution requires anomaly detection capability
as well as basic security capabilities. On the contrary, AI-
enabled API security keep track of historical traffic trend
along security with existing foundational security features and
detect malicious behavior as a first line of defense. Traditional
security measures provided by Content Distribution Networks
Fig. 1: API Security Model
(CDNs), Web Application Firewall (WAFs) and API Gateways
can be easily bypassed by finely tuned attacks on APIs.
API implementations are based on either REpresentational
State Transfer (REST) or Simple Object Access Protocol
(SOAP), and are secured in different ways as discussed in the
following subsections. Generally speaking, SOAP APIs have
more comprehensive security measures and are recommended
for handling sensitive data.
1) Access control management: By granting or rejecting
an access to APIs is the first line of defence for the internal
resources. Controlling the amount of data released to the
cyber-world is possible by limiting access to specific endpoints
or data for individual clients. Access management is typically
performed using key to identify applications calling the APIs
as well as the end users. This key has access to specific
endpoints and has access privileges for certain data limit.
To this end, Open Authorization (OAuth) and OpenID are
used for user authentication and authorization for the web
services. OAuth is the open standard for access management
and it enables users to have access to API resources with-
out sharing passwords. OAuth is complimented with another
standard, OpenID Connect (OIDC). This is an identity layer
on top of the OAuth framework, and it authenticates users by
obtaining the basic profile information.
2) Communication security: Transport Layer Security
(TLS)/ Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is used for the commu-
nication security of any web service. TLS standard is used to
establish secure connection between two endpoints (client and
server) and it makes sure that the data sent between them
is encrypted and unaltered. REST APIs use HTTP and is
supported by TLS encryption. It also uses JavaScript Object
Notation (JSON) (a file format used to transfer data securely
and efficiently over web browsers). By using HTTP and JSON,
REST APIs do not need to store or repackage the data,
and are considered faster and easily manageable than the
SOAP APIs. SOAP APIs use built-in protocols such as Web
Services Security (WS Security) and use a combination of
XML encryption, XML signatures, and SAML tokens to verify
authentication and authorization.
3) Client throttling: Client throttling enables the access
limits for APIs, i.e, how often an API can be called? and
also track its usage over certain time period. Carefully crafted
throttling rules can protect APIs from spikes and DoS attacks.
For instance, more calls to an API indicate that it might being
abused, or it might be a programming mistake and API is being
called in an endless loop. This information is very useful for
identifying and preventing various access related issues.
4) API gateways security: The API gateway is considered
as the core infrastructure unit that enforces and manages
API security. Enforcing security through API gateway is
comparatively new concept and serves better for API security
unlike traditional security measures. API security management
performs message analysis, access tokens and authorization
parameters grants, and therefore API gateway checks autho-
rization of users followed by message parameter’s and content
checks (sent by authorized users). It also ensures that the client
data is not written when usage logs are maintained. Hence,
API gateway acts like a traffic police and ensures that only
legitimate users are allowed access to APIs and rest of them
are blocked. It also encrypts or redacts( censor or obscure
(part of a text) for legal or security purpose) confidential
information, control, and analyze the APIs usage. Essentially,
with the help of an API gateway, we are moving security from
the application into the organizational infrastructure.
C. Limitations of Traditional API Security Model
As discussed already, API has the pivotal role in the realiza-
tion of the Programmable Web. Till the start of 2018, a steep
growth has been observed in the web APIs [3].As the business
grows, the inter-operability among different components of
the same business or with the partner businesses is crucial
to the growth and expansion of the business and thus needs
paramount of attention. APIs are the only viable way to
address this issue and the security of these APIs is funda-
mentally essential. The traditional security mechanisms such
as OAuth and others (as mentioned already) focus on only the
visible aspects of the security such as authentication, access
control, and authorization. However, with the growth in API
development and the emergence of new APIs, it also increase
the risk of the exposure of sensitive data beyond the business
boundaries. The traditional approach of ”limiting access to
the API” instead of mitigating the attacks, has not been so
encouraging. This argument is based on the attacks against
sophisticated APIs so far. Furthermore, every new API brings
a long a new attack vector associated to it. Therefore, it is quite
hard to address the security attacks on APIs through a singular
traditional approach such as access control. In fact, there are
targeted attacks that disrupt the normal functionality of the
APIs. For instance, (Distributed) Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks against log-in services are still possible against APIs
incorporating strong access control mechanismsSimilarly, the
stolen or shared credentials may also result in catastrophic
attacks on the API. Additionally, the traditional injection, data
stealing, and manipulation attacks are still possible in APIs.
The traditional APIs may not be able to mitigate these types of
attacks. Therefore, more versatile, variable, context-aware, and
intelligent security mechanism is needed for API security. In
the following, we describe the need for Artificial Intelligence
(AI) and Machine Learning (ML)-based API security.
D. Machine Learning and API Security
With the evolution of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) and
the diversification of threat model, it is essential to make the
smart API security as an integral part of the API operations.
Machine Learning (ML) can be used not only to identify the
malicious intent in transactions of data across platforms but
it also helps evolving the security practices in the wake of
current security practices. To date, ML has been widely used
in the security of systems and networks, for instance, context-
aware authentication, authorization, intrusion detection, mal-
ware analysis, and so on [4], [5].
In the context of API security, ML is primarily leveraged to
learn patterns of normal behavior incorporating the contextual
information for each API. The identified patterns are then
used to identify and block potential cyber attacks on the APIs.
Continuous learning capabilities are added to the system and
APIs through which anomalous behavior can be identified,
even without written policies or prior knowledge of common
attack patterns ( zero-day attacks). In short, ML can extend
the API security beyond access control and communication
security , and help filling the security gaps such as addressing
new cyber threats, identifying the behavior of the past attacks,
making predictions on the basis of existing patterns to manage
the API security, and so on.
Detailed discussion about ML-based API security, available
techniques and platforms can be found in [2].
III. GENERAL DATA PROTECTION RULE (GDPR)
European Union Parliament approved a revolutionary regu-
lation on the personal data protection in April 2016 and it is
functional since May 2015. The enforcement of GDPR can be
seen as reshaping the personal data protection against misuse
by the legitimate entities, such as the firms that collect the
customer data. GDPR emphasizes on personal data protection,
transparency and data ownership rights for individual users.
In addition to this, it also gives right and access to users,
how they wish to get their data treated, as shown in Figure 2.
Personal data in GDPR is defined as any information that can
identify any individual directly or indirectly, and ”Personal
Data Processing” is defined as the set of automated/manual
operations, performed on the personal data [7]. These opera-
tions include data collection, recording, organization, structur-
ing, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination, alignment or
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction [8]etc. GDPR
applies to companies in European Union, as well as any
company across the globe that processes the personal data
of any EU’s individual. This processing can be either (i)
goods/services offerings to data subjects in the EU, or (ii)
their behaviour monitoring.
From enterprise perspective, GDPR requires:
• Transparency: Clear policies must be defined for data
protection, data processing and data portability of the
customer related information.
• Access control: Enterprises must possess proper security
tools as well as processes for protection of the customers
private data.
• Personal privacy and right to be forgotten: A customer
older than 16 years of age has full right to dictate
what type of data an enterprise can collect about that
customer. Furthermore, the customer has full right to
demand his/her data to be deleted after usage.
A. Contradiction of GDPR Rules with ML
GDPR grants three important rights to the owner (data
subject) of personal data: right of non-discrimination, right to
explanation, and the right to be forgotten. In the following, we
discuss these rights with respect to ML work flows, i.e, feature
engineering and data wrangling. We also discuss ML modeling
development, model deployment, and model management.
1) Feature engineering and non-discrimination right: Per-
sonal data processing rules are the pillars of GDPR, i.e, reveal-
ing racial/ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs,
bio-metric data used for identification purposes, health data,
data related to sexual orientation, and the processing of genetic
data are protected by GDPR. For instance, these data points
are incredibly valuable in genetic research, and being used
for predictive modelling in the different domains. However,
explicit consent is required by the data subjects for opting
in for such model training as well as for on going model
retraining for improving the model accuracy.
2) Modelling, prediction and right to explanation: Clients,
customers, and/or users have the right to understand the
processing logic and reasons for any potential decisions made
for or on behalf of them. Therefore, the Processors (enterprise)
are bound to provide meaningful information about the deci-
sion logic and justification of any prediction and envisaged
consequences of this processing for the data owner. However,
this is very difficult for authorities to decide , how deep
this explanation right should go? Is it essential to explain
all the data transformation-related details to the data owner?
How difficult it is to interpret the entire predictive modeling
processes, specifically when multiple algorithms are involved
in a work flow?
3) Model retaining/updates and Right to be Forgotten: This
right permits data owners to dictate processors (enterprise) to
erase all personal data associated with him/ her. Apparently,
it seems very straightforward to delete corresponding account
and related data. However, it poses lots of technical challenges
for ML models, if retraining and regular update of ML model
is required which in turns require availability of one’s data.
Does data owners ts have the right to authenticate first weather
their data is used to retrain the predictive model or not? How
ML model will be retrained without data? Where the line
should be drawn in terms of amount of data to be retained
and to be forgotten.
4) Global privacy and data localization : It deals with all
the issues related to the storage and transfer of personal data
across the countries or regions. GDPR defines this personal
data as ”any data revealing racial/ethnic origin, health related
Fig. 2: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)[6]
data, religious/philosophical beliefs, sexual orientation data,
and genetic/biometric data”. These perceptions of human abil-
ities and personal interests make human profiles. In todays’s
world of ”Internet of Things”, profiling is carried out by
machines using ML algorithms. ML is used for data mining
of the available personal data to obtain important information
from the available commercial databases such as maintenance
records, loan applications, financial transactions, and medical
records. These records are fed to ML algorithm by the data
controller or processor (third party cloud) or by both. These
personal data processing or profiling might requires real-time
data processing (depending on the type of application), which
might happen locally at data controller as well as sent to the
cloud for dynamic training of the algorithm. In this situation,
data portability with individual’s consent becomes complex
and time consuming.
GDPR also argues on the decisions made as a result of
profiling. It does not limit profiling but requires that a decision
made on such profiling is made in a way that it does not have
legal or any other significant effects on the individual.
Also, with the increasing trend in trans-border personal data
flows in today’s data-driven economy, it is becoming very
important as well as difficult for any jurisdictions capacity
to enforce personal data protection laws beyond its territory.
GDPR restricts the rights of personal data, its portability,
and processing solely to the individual itself. A controller or
processor is any ”person, public authority, agency or other
body which processes personal data on behalf of controller”,
and can transfer any personal data to a third country or
any international organization after ensuring and providing
appropriate safeguards. It is responsibility of controller and
processor to make sure that enforceable rights and effective
legal remedies for data subjects are made available.
In case of a security breach of the data involving per-
sonal data, the controller (can alone or jointly with others,
determines the purposes and means of processing personal
data) should notify Data Protection Authority (DPA) within
a reasonable duration of time. Entire obligation is on data
processor and controller to keep record of all types of data
storage/processing activities.
IV. API SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE WITH GDPR
GDPR has a significant effect on ML-enabled security as
GDPR imposes restriction on the use of automated decision
making including profiling (Article 22) [8]. This leads to an
impression that further development of ML-enabled decisions
are hampered. Specifically, in this era of Cyber-Physical
System and big data in which automated decisions and pre-
dictive analysis are done in almost every walks of life, GDPR
compliance with ML enabled solutions seems unacceptable
and un-adaptable. Nevertheless, it is easier to narrow down
and avoid decisions that directly affect individual, however, it
is unclear to signify the type of harmful profiling. For instance,
advertisements sent by Google and Facebook have negative
effect or not? In fact detailed clarification and classification
are required to distinguish among various automated decisions,
essentially being procedural or substantive, rule-based or law-
based [9].
A. Does GDPR affect the ML-driven API Security?
GDPR will significantly affect the ML-driven security so-
lutions and will tie down the digital development specifically
in EU and to some extend in rest of the world. Consumers
routinely interacting with ML enabled services such as; per-
sonal assistants chatbots, robo-advisors( providing automated
financial advice) and applications using streaming services
(movie recommendations) will be significantly affected.
GDPR restrictions will increase the cost of ML-driven
solutions directly or indirectly. For instance, requirement to
explain details of algorithmic decisions to human is not only
complex but also time consuming that demands particular
skills. The right of data portability does not directly affect
ML- driven services, but it increase the cost indirectly. As
it restricts the companies for creating and maintaining large
and complex data sets in reusable formats [10]. Also, there
is a trade-off between algorithmic transparency and accuracy.
Therefore more transparent and less accurate algorithms are
developed to explain algorithmic decisions to consumers, and
it might lead to unfair decision making. Similarly, prohibition
on solely-automated decisions might lead to humans making
unfair and un-reasonable decisions. This will also prohibit use
of rational algorithms , which are adaptable to modification in
data and can be adjusted over time to account for unintended
biases [11].
In addition to above, right of data erasure (given to data sub-
ject) without any undue delay (Article 17(1) of the GDPR), can
be problematic for ML-driven services as some ML algorithms
need to keep the data used in the training. By removing this
data algorithms effectiveness can be impacted, or even it can
break the necessary flow of it. As these algorithms tend to use
this data by generating new rules for data (future) processing
to improve themselves.
B. Data and Computational Transparency
Automated decision making is prohibited in GDPR, and it
is defined as the decisions made without human intervention.
As the personal data of an individual is used in any decision
making, it is needed to be transparent to users how and
why any decisions are made (Article 13,14)? However, many
challenges are associated with making this transparency to
work. In the following, we will discuss few of the associated
challenges:
1) Technical challenges: According to GDPR, a controller
using user data for some automated decision making is obliged
to provide meaningful information about logic used in making
such decisions. This enables users to express their opinion
about these decisions and also have right to challenge them,
if required. Questions such as what exactly is needed to be
revealed to the owner?’, how algorithms (used for decision
making) can be explained?, and how the complexity of an
algorithm can be simplified to be explained to the owner?.
However, technical obstacles are faced for explaining the algo-
rithms. These obstacles vary with the variation in complexity
of algorithms and learning speed. For instance, simple tree
based algorithms are easy to explain as compared to neural
networks which are almost impossible to explain. Neural
networks, ML and deep learning are considered as ”Black
Box” and it is very difficult to explain or identify potential
point of failure. As these complex algorithms are opaque even
for developers and it becomes very challenging to educate non
technical users.
2) Intellectual property: In addition to technical and user
awareness challenges, state secrecy and intellectual property
issues cannot be overlooked. Algorithmic transparency can
lead to the exposure of intellectual property to the public
which can not only jeopardize the privacy of the computational
secret but also can endanger the policies (reasons behind
decisions) of the authorities. For instance, tax authority will
never like to reveal algorithms used to select tax payers for
secondary/detailed review. Similarly, a financial institution will
not disclose the ML model used for mortgage percentage or
interest rates.
IP-related issues are other pressing issues that hinder the
data transparency. According to Trade- Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) copyright treaty,
software programs are protected with Copy Write act. In
this situation, concrete measures should be taken to keep the
algorithm transparency as well as maintaining Copy write
acts. This means that GDPR’s required transparency can be
achieved by only sharing ”logic behind decisions”, and not
the algorithm itself.
C. Data Localization and Storage
Traditionally, three main types of data localization ap-
proaches exists; the jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction, organization-
to-organization, and the data localization approaches [12].
Jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction approach governs trans-border data
flows based on adequate and equivalent national data pro-
tection laws. While organization-to-organization approach put
this responsibility on individual data controllers for meeting
data protection’ standards (when respective data is processed
offshore). Lastly, data localization approach depends on public
policy efforts to store personal data within a particular ju-
risdictions boundaries. This is the new trend but underlying
meanings and intentions are complex and are associated with
specific type of the data such as financial, health or medical
records etc. GDPR is in accordance to third approach of data
localization.
In light of GDPR and data localization, major changes are
required for the entire ecosystem. New cloud infrastructures
are required across EU as well across the globe to accom-
modate GDPR laws. Major paradigm shift is expected in the
data storage systems, and in-house storage. Furthermore, in-
house processing and storage of personal data seems more
appropriate solution as compared to public cloud. ((( do
you mean appropriate for processing data in private cloud
or storage? please read the sentence again and correct it.
Because it is very challenging to provide transparency (ability
to directly understand where data is being stored and how data
processing is performed) of personal data in public clouds.)))
To keep GDPR compliance, an organization can only transfer
data to external processor by ensuring adequate levels of data
protection and privacy. If there are security doubts about any
particular destination, controller, or processor, the data cannot
travel there [13]. Considering the cost of non-compliance with
GDPR, most of the multinational companies will move to in-
house processing units.
Also, as per GDPR, data processing is restricted to the
consent of the data subject. It is also worth mentioning that the
corporate customer and employee data might be dispersed as
structured or unstructured data across the cloud, on-premises,
or on local/distributed file systems. Therefore, remote con-
trolling (deletion, processing, transfer with subject’s consent
or intention) of personal data, stored in the file systems and
proprietary cloud might not be straightforward. It will be very
challenging task to obtain an accurate and comprehensive view
of the personal data across an enterprise and capture of data
across systems.
V. CONCLUSION
GDPR strictly advocates for ”privacy by design”, i.e.,
data protection computational explainability should be in-
cluded during the system development rather than adding it
later. Similarly, businesses should practice privacy-preserving
analytic methods, business models and techniques such as
differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, and federated
learning. Therefore, transparency, interpretability, and explain-
ability should be considered by data professionals, ML experts
and business personals.
For the existing ML-enabled API security solutions, there
are requirements of other softwares or applications to explain
an automated decision(s) made by intelligent software (or
machine), to meet the GDPR requirements. One such effort
is Quantitative Input Influence (QII) [14], which is used to
reach the transparency of an algorithm. QII is developed to
clarify and explain ML algorithm (and related factors), that
were used in any automated decision making.
In a nutshell, it is imperative to investigate the effect of
ML-enabled API security mechanisms on the GDPR.
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